Bark with No Bite: How the Inevitable Discovery Rule is Undermining the Supreme Court’s Decision in Arizona v. Gant by Scott R. Grubman
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 101 | Issue 1 Article 4
Winter 2011
Bark with No Bite: How the Inevitable Discovery
Rule is Undermining the Supreme Court’s
Decision in Arizona v. Gant
Scott R. Grubman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Scott R. Grubman, Bark with No Bite: How the Inevitable Discovery Rule is Undermining the Supreme Court’s Decision in Arizona v. Gant,
101 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 119 (2013).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol101/iss1/4
0091-4169/11/10101-0119 
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 101, No. 1 
Copyright © 2011 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A. 
119 
BARK WITH NO BITE: HOW THE 
INEVITABLE DISCOVERY RULE IS 
UNDERMINING THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISION IN ARIZONA V. GANT 
SCOTT R. GRUBMAN*
In 2009, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Arizona v. Gant, in 
which it significantly limited the search incident to arrest exception in the 
automobile search context.  Despite what many experts predicted, Gant did 
not open the floodgates of evidence suppression.  This is because the Gant 
holding is substantially undermined by the inevitable discovery rule, under 
which otherwise illegally-seized evidence is deemed admissible under 
certain circumstances.  This article discusses why the Court’s decision in 
Gant lacks real-world, practical effect, and how the Court can close the 
loophole in its Gant holding. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The late scholar Karl Llewellyn wrote that “the rule follows where its 
reason leads; where the reason stops, there stops the rule.”1  Apart from the 
poetic and literary value of this quotation, Professor Llewellyn’s point is 
quite simple and abundantly relevant in all areas of the law: when a rule is 
created for certain reasons, and those reasons cease to exist, the rule should 
no longer be applied.  Courts have utilized Professor Llewellyn’s axiom in 
various areas of the law, refusing to apply rules to situations in which the 
reasons justifying the rules are no longer present.2
 
* Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice.  Special thanks to Robert H. Snyder, Jr. for 
his invaluable insight and assistance.  The views expressed in this Article are those of the 
author and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Justice. 
 
1 K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 189 (Oceana 
Publications, Inc. 1981) (1930) (emphasis omitted). 
2 See, e.g., Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(applying Llewellyn’s principle in insurance context); Anderson v. United Tel. Co. of Kan., 
933 F.2d 1500, 1504 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying principle in context of motion for directed 
verdict); G. & T. Terminal Packaging Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 830 F.2d 1230, 1238 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (applying principle in context of federal preemption). 
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However, in at least one area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement—the 
Supreme Court of the United States has refused to apply Llewellyn’s 
principle.  In Chimel v. California,3 the Supreme Court discussed the twin 
rationales for the search incident to arrest exception—the need to disarm the 
arrestee and to discover and preserve evidence.4  Despite these stated 
rationales, for years the Court expanded the search incident to arrest 
doctrine well beyond that which was necessary to accomplish its dual 
purposes.  Nowhere was this more apparent than in the automobile context: 
once an occupant or a recent occupant of a vehicle was placed under arrest, 
the police were permitted to conduct a full search of the vehicle’s passenger 
compartment as well any containers therein, including consoles, glove 
compartments, luggage, and bags.5  Further, the police did not lose this 
authority when the arrestee was handcuffed in the back of a patrol car at the 
time of the search and, therefore, could not possibly grab a weapon or hide 
evidence.6  As Justice O’Connor wrote in a concurring opinion, “court 
decisions seem[ed] . . . to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the 
arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an 
exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel v. California.”7
In 2009, when the search incident to arrest exception seemed to have 
no limits in the automobile context, the Supreme Court issued its decision 
in Arizona v. Gant.
 
8  In Gant, the Court seemed to reverse its previous 
course by severely limiting an officer’s authority to search a vehicle when 
the arrestee is detained and therefore cannot access weapons or evidence.9  
The Court in Gant held that the twin rationales articulated in Chimel allow 
vehicle searches “incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the 
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search,”10 or “when it is ‘reasonable to 
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the 
vehicle.’”11
 
3 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
  Gant was immediately hailed by legal commentators and law 
enforcement experts alike as a landmark case in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  The Court’s decision in Gant both provided hope to many, 
4 Id. at 763–64. 
5 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981).  
6 See infra Part II.B.3.   
7 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
8 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
9 Id. at 1719. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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including civil libertarians and defense lawyers, and frightened many 
others, including law enforcement interest groups and prosecutors.12
However, despite what many experts predicted, Gant has not opened 
the floodgates of evidence suppression.  This is because Gant has primarily 
been undermined by another exception to the warrant requirement that 
allows otherwise illegally obtained evidence to be admitted if the 
government can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the items 
seized inevitably would have been discovered during a subsequent and 
lawful inventory search of the vehicle.
 
13
In this Article, I will discuss the search incident to arrest exception to 
the warrant requirement from the origins of the doctrine to the Court’s most 
recent decisions.  Part II of the Article discusses the history of the search 
incident to arrest exception, both in general and within the automobile 
context.  Part III discusses the Court’s recent decision in Gant.  Part IV 
explains why the practical effects of Gant are not as significant as some 
may have hoped them to be and suggests several ways in which the Court 
could close the loophole in its holding in Gant. 
  It appears that the Court’s 
landmark decision in Gant has had little practical effect on the availability 
or exclusion of evidence. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORY OF THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION 
In 1914, the Supreme Court mentioned, in dicta, what would 
subsequently become one of the most widely utilized, and perhaps widely 
abused, exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement: the 
search incident to a lawful arrest exception.14  In Weeks v. United States,15
 
12 See, e.g., Ken Wallentine, PoliceOne Analysis: Arizona v. Gant, POLICEONE.COM 
(Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.policeone.com/legal/articles/1813475-PoliceOne-Analysis-
Arizona-v- Gant/ (discussing concerns over the Gant decision).  In a New York Times article 
written the same day Gant was decided, William J. Johnson, the executive director of the 
National Association of Police Organizations, had this to say about the Court’s decision: 
“It’s just terrible . . . .  It’s certainly going to result in less drug and weapons cases being 
made.”  Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Cuts Back Officers’ Searches of Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 21, 2009, at A12. 
 a 
case known for its establishment of the exclusionary rule, the Court stated: 
13 See infra note 220.  
14 For a further discussion of the potential for abuse of the search incident to arrest 
exception, see Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search 
Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 396 (2001); Michael Schoen, Garcia v. 
State: A Recent Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Decision Resolves the Texas Pretext 
Debate in Favor of an Objective Approach, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 781, 784 (1993). 
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What then is the present case?  Before answering that inquiry specifically, it may be 
well by a process of exclusion to state what it is not.  It is not an assertion of the right 
on the part of the Government, always recognized under English and American law, 
to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the 
fruits or evidence of crime.  This right has been uniformly maintained in many 
cases.16
Although the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement was not directly at issue in Weeks, the Supreme Court 
nonetheless offered its express support for that common law doctrine.
 
17  
However, because the doctrine was not at issue in that case, the Weeks 
Court failed to discuss its contours.  For instance, the Court did not discuss 
whether the search incident to arrest doctrine allowed officers to search the 
place where an arrest occurs.18  Instead, the language of Weeks only 
approved of the practice of searching the person of an arrestee in order to 
discover and seize fruits or evidence of crime.19
The Court elaborated on the search incident to arrest doctrine eleven 
years after Weeks, in Carroll v. United States.
 
20  The defendants in Caroll 
were convicted of transporting intoxicating liquors in an automobile.21  
They argued that the trial court erred when it admitted two of the bottles 
that were found in their vehicle during a search subsequent to their arrest.22  
According to the defendants, that search and seizure violated the Fourth 
Amendment and, therefore, the court should have excluded the evidence.23  
In upholding the convictions, the Court cited its earlier decision in Weeks 
and, in fact, elaborated on that previous dicta, holding that “[w]hen a man is 
legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his 
control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to 
prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution.”24
 
15 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
  
However, as the Supreme Court subsequently stated, the Court’s assertion 
16 Id. at 392. 
17 See Michael Goodin, Arizona v. Gant: The Supreme Court Gets It Right (Almost), 87 
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 115, 119–20 (2010) (discussing history of search incident to arrest 
exception, including Weeks). 
18 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969). 
19 Id.; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392. 
20 267 U.S. 132 (1924). 
21 Id. at 134. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 158 (emphasis added). 
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in Carroll “was far from a claim that the ‘place’ where one is arrested may 
be searched so long as the arrest is valid.”25
However, in the same year that Carroll was decided, the Supreme 
Court issued its decision in Agnello v. United States.
 
26  In Agnello, the 
Court once again expanded the scope of the common law search incident to 
arrest exception to the warrant requirement, making it applicable not only to 
a search of the arrestee’s person, but also to a search of the place where the 
arrest is made.27
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully 
arrested while committing a crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in 
order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by 
which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from 
custody, is not to be doubted.
  Citing both Weeks and Carroll, the Agnello Court held: 
28
This rule from Agnello was solidified two years later in Marron v. 
United States.
 
29  In Marron, federal prohibition agents obtained a warrant to 
search a particular location being leased by the defendant.30  The search 
warrant authorized the agents to seize any intoxicating liquors and articles 
for their manufacture.31  When agents arrived at the location to execute the 
search warrant, the defendant was not there, but they found evidence that 
the property was being used for the sale and consumption of intoxicating 
liquors.32  After placing one individual under arrest, the agents searched for 
and found large quantities of liquor, some of which was in a closet.33  While 
searching that closet, they noticed a ledger showing inventories of liquors, 
receipts, and expenses.34  They also found a number of bills in the 
defendant’s name for gas, electric, water, and telephone service.35  They 
seized both the ledger and the bills.36
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the ledger and bills, 
arguing that these items were seized in violation of the Fourth 
 
 
25 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 756 (1969). 
26 269 U.S. 20 (1925). 
27 See Goodin, supra note 17, at 120. 
28 Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158; Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 392 (1914)).   
29 275 U.S. 192 (1927). 
30 Id. at 193. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 193–94. 
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Amendment.37  Specifically, the defendant argued that because the ledger 
and bills were not described in the warrant and because he was not arrested 
with them on his person, their seizure was illegal.38  The Government 
responded that the seizure was justified as either incident to the execution of 
the search warrant or as incident to the arrest made while executing the 
warrant.39  In affirming the defendant’s conviction, the Court held that 
because the agents made a lawful arrest, “[t]hey had a right without a 
warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to find and seize the 
things used to carry on the criminal enterprise.”40
However, it did not take long for the Supreme Court to limit its 
holding in Marron.  In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,
  After Agnello and 
Marron, police could utilize the search incident to arrest exception to justify 
a warrantless search of both the arrestee’s person and the place where the 
arrest was made. 
41 after 
federal agents placed several individuals under arrest for dealing in 
intoxicating liquors, the agents conducted a search of the offenders’ 
offices.42  During this search, through the threat of force, the agents gained 
access to a locked desk and safe, from which they took certain papers.43  
The agents also searched other parts of the office and seized more papers.44  
The defendants in Go-Bart moved to exclude the papers that were seized 
during the search.45  The Court in Go-Bart assumed, without deciding, that 
the arrests made in that case were lawful, despite being made without a 
warrant.46  The Court then discussed whether the search and seizure were 
justified in light of the lawful arrests.  In describing the incident, the Court 
noted that the officers did not observe any crime and that although the 
officer in charge “had an abundance of information and time to swear out a 
valid warrant, he failed to do so.”47
 
37 Id. 
  The Court went on to distinguish the 
case before it from Marron, noting that the officers in Marron were 
executing a valid search warrant, the arrestee was actively engaged in 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 194–95. 
40 Id. at 199 (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1924); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)). 
41 282 U.S. 344 (1931). 
42 Id. at 349. 
43 Id. at 349–50. 
44 Id. at 350. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 356. 
47 Id. at 358. 
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illegal activity, and “[t]here was no threat of force or general search or 
rummaging” because the items seized “were visible and accessible.”48  
Based on the facts of the case before it, the Court in Go-Bart held that the 
search conducted was unreasonable and, therefore, that the evidence should 
be suppressed.49
Just one year after Go-Bart was decided, the Court decided another 
case in which it limited the applicability of its holding in Marron.  In 
United States v. Lefkowitz, federal prohibition agents applied for and 
received a warrant to arrest the defendant.
 
50  After entering the location 
listed in the warrant—a room that was approximately ten feet wide by 
twenty feet long—the agents placed the defendant under arrest and began 
searching the room and seizing various papers.51  The agents opened all the 
drawers of the two desks in the room, examined their contents, and seized 
books, papers, and other items.52  The agents also searched a towel cabinet 
located in the room and seized papers from it as well.53  However, unlike in 
Go-Bart, the desks and the cabinet were not locked when the agents opened 
them.54
The defendant in Lefkowitz moved to suppress the evidence seized 
during the search.
 
55  The defendant’s motion to suppress was denied by the 
district court, but the Second Circuit reversed, citing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Go-Bart.56  In deciding whether the search was lawful under the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court in Lefkowitz first noted that the defendant in 
that case was lawfully arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant.57  The Court 
also noted that, as in Go-Bart, the officers did not observe a crime being 
committed.58  The Court held that the agents “assumed the right 
contemporaneously with the arrest to search out and scrutinize everything 
in the room in order to ascertain whether the books, papers or other things 
contained or constituted evidence of . . .  [a] crime . . . .  Their conduct was 
unrestrained.”59
 
48 Id. at 358. 
  The Court further held that a law enforcement agent’s 
49 Id. 
50 285 U.S. 452, 458 (1932). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 458–59. 
53 Id. at 459–60. 
54 Id. at 460. 
55 Id. at 460–61. 
56 Id. at 461. 
57 Id. at 462. 
58 Id. at 462–63. 
59 Id. at 463–64. 
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authority to conduct a search incident to arrest “is not greater than that 
conferred by a search warrant.”60  The Court reasoned that the use of search 
warrants was more likely to protect against unlawful searches “than by 
reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under 
the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime.”61
The Court then went on to distinguish the facts of the case before it 
from the facts present in Marron.  The Court noted that, in Marron, the 
officers observed a crime being committed in their presence, that the 
arrestee was maintaining a nuisance in violation of federal law, that the 
offense involved the element of continuity (consumption and sale of 
alcohol), that the ledger and bills were in plain view when seized, and that 
the ledger and bills were closely related to the offense being investigated.
 
62  
The Court held that “[t]he facts disclosed in the [Marron] opinion were held 
to justify the inference that when the arrest was made the ledger and bills 
were in use to carry on the criminal enterprise.”63
The Court in Lefkowitz held that, unlike the situation in Marron, the 
facts of the case before it did not justify the search and seizure.
 
64  In 
particular, the Court noted that “the searches were exploratory and general 
and made solely to find evidence of respondents’ guilt of the alleged 
conspiracy or some other crime,”65 and that, “[t]hough intended to be used 
to solicit orders for liquor in violation of the Act, the papers and other 
articles found and taken were in themselves unoffending.”66  The Court 
noted that, in previous decisions, it had created a distinction between 
searches to find evidence to convict an individual of a crime and searches to 
find stolen goods or seize forfeited property, as well as searches conducted 
“in order to prevent the commission of [a] crime.”67  The Lefkowitz Court 
concluded that the case before it did “not differ materially from the Go-Bart 
case and is ruled by it.  An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for 
evidence.  The searches and seizures here challenged must be held violative 
of respondents’ rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”68
 
60 Id. at 464. 
 
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 465. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 467. 
65 Id. at 465. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 465–66 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383, 395 (1914)). 
68 Id. at 467. 
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Go-Bart and Lefkowitz illustrate that, in the early 1930s, the Supreme 
Court attempted to limit the scope of permissible police actions during a 
search incident to a lawful arrest.69  However, this limiting trend would not 
continue indefinitely.  For example, in Harris v. United States,70 the Court 
seemed to expand the authority given to police under the search incident to 
arrest exception.71  In Harris, federal agents obtained two warrants for the 
defendant’s arrest, one for mail fraud and the other for sending a forged 
check through interstate commerce.72  FBI agents went to the defendant’s 
apartment, placed him under arrest, put him in handcuffs, and then began to 
search the entire apartment, which consisted of four rooms: a living room, a 
bedroom, a bathroom, and a kitchen.73  The stated reasons for the search 
were to find two canceled checks that were “thought to have been used in 
effecting the forgery” and to find “any means that might have been used to 
commit” the crimes.74  Over the defendant’s objections, the agents 
conducted a thorough search of the entire apartment that lasted for 
approximately five hours.75  During the search, one of the agents discovered 
in a bedroom bureau drawer a sealed envelope marked “George Harris, 
personal papers.”76  The agent tore open the envelope and found the 
defendant’s altered Selective Service documents.77  After the district court 
denied the defendant’s motion to suppress this evidence,78 the seized 
documents were used to convict the defendant of violating the Selective 
Service Act.79
 
69 See Kenneth M. Murchison, Prohibition and the Fourth Amendment: A New Look at 
Some Old Cases, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 501–02 (1982) (discussing how Go-
Bart and Lefkowitz represented a break from Court’s Prohibition Era search incident to arrest 
decisions). 
  The Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction, 
finding that “the search was carried on in good faith by the federal agents 
for the purposes expressed, that it was not a general exploratory search for 
70 331 U.S. 145 (1947). 
71 See James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the Search Incident to 
Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 
1424 (2007) (discussing history of search incident to arrest exception and noting that Harris 
was an abrupt break from Court’s previous decisions). 
72 Harris, 331 U.S. at 148. 
73 Id. at 148. 
74 Id. at 148–49. 




79 Id. at 146. 
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merely evidentiary materials, and that the search and seizure were a 
reasonable incident to petitioner’s arrest.”80
The Court in Harris affirmed the defendant’s conviction, finding that 
the search at issue was lawful as a search incident to arrest.
 
81  In support of 
its conclusion, the Court appeared to expand the search incident to arrest 
doctrine by leaps and bounds, holding that, not only were the police 
permitted to search the room in which the defendant was arrested, but could 
search his entire four-room apartment because, in the words of the Court, 
“[h]is control extended quite as much to the bedroom in which the draft 
cards were found as to the living room in which he was arrested.”82  
Because the evidence at issue could “easily have been concealed in any of 
the four rooms of the apartment,” the police were permitted to conduct a 
broad search.83  Although the Court recognized that other cases might call 
for more limited searches, it held that “the area which reasonably may be 
subjected to search is not to be determined by the fortuitous circumstance 
that the arrest took place in the living room as contrasted to some other 
room of the apartment.”84
The Court in Harris distinguished the facts of the case before it from 
the facts present in Go-Bart, holding that Go-Bart involved a situation 
where officers “entered premises ostensibly for the purpose of making an 
arrest but in reality for the purpose of conducting a general exploratory 
search for merely evidentiary materials tending to connect the accused with 
some crime.”
 
85  By contrast, the Court noted that, in Harris, “the agents 
were in possession of facts indicating petitioner’s probable guilt of the 
crimes for which the warrants of arrest were issued.  The search was not a 
general exploration but was specifically directed to the means and 
instrumentalities by which the crimes charged had been committed . . . .”86  
The Court concluded that “[t]he search which followed the arrest was 
appropriate for the discovery of such objects.  Nothing in the agents’ 
conduct was inconsistent with their declared purpose.”87
Although the Supreme Court appeared ready and willing to 
significantly expand the search incident to arrest exception in Harris, just 
 
 
80 Id. at 150. 
81 Id. at 155. 
82 Id. at 152. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 153. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
2011] BARK WITH NO BITE 129 
 
one year later the pendulum swung once again, this time toward limiting the 
exception.88  Whereas the legality of the search in Harris was upheld by a 
five to four vote, the search at issue in Trupiano v. United States89 was 
declared unconstitutional by the same margin.90  The petitioners in 
Trupiano built and operated an illegal distillery.91  Unbeknownst to the 
petitioners, federal agents were informed of their operation and one of the 
agents went undercover as a farm hand, assisting the petitioners in building 
the distillery.92  Based on information provided by the undercover agent, 
other federal agents traveled to the distillery one evening.93  As they drove 
onto the premises, the agents could smell fermenting mash and could hear 
the distillery equipment.94  As they approached the distillery, one of the 
agents looked through an open door and could see the equipment.95  The 
agents then entered the building, placed the petitioners under arrest, and 
“seized the illicit distillery.”96  After the arrest, the agents conducted a 
further search and found a large number of cans containing alcohol as well 
as several vats containing fermenting mash.97  The petitioners moved to 
suppress the evidence seized by the agents, arguing that it was obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.98  The district court denied the motion 
to suppress and the Third Circuit affirmed.99
In reversing the Third Circuit and holding that the search was 
unlawful, the Court in Trupiano first noted that the agents engaged in the 
raid “without securing a search warrant or warrants of arrest,”
 
100 despite the 
fact that “they had more than adequate opportunity to obtain such warrants 
before the raid occurred . . . .”101
 
88 See Tomkovicz, supra note 
  The Court described the case as one 
“where contraband property was seized by federal agents without a search 
71, at 1424 (discussing inconsistencies amongst search 
incident to arrest decisions during this time period). 
89 334 U.S. 699 (1948). 
90 Id. at 709–10.  Justice Douglas, who joined the majority in Harris, provided the fifth 
(swing) vote in Trupiano.  See J. Woodford Howard Jr., On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 
62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 43, 53 (1968). 
91 Trupiano, 334 U.S. at 701. 
92 Id. 





98 Id. at 699. 
99 Id. at 703. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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warrant under circumstances where such a warrant could easily have been 
obtained.”102  The Court held that, although the warrantless arrests were 
valid because the arresting agents observed a felony being committed in 
their presence,103 the search was not lawful as an incident to those arrests.104  
The Court held that “[i]t is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, 
law enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants wherever 
reasonably practicable.”105  The Court noted that, in the case before it, the 
agents knew “every detail of the construction and operation of the illegal 
distillery long before the raid was made,” and that the undercover agent 
“was in a position to supply information which could easily have formed 
the basis for a detailed and effective search warrant.”106  Further, the Court 
held that “there was an abundance of time during which such a warrant 
could have been secured, even on the night of the raid after the odor and 
noise of the distillery confirmed their expectations.”107  The Court also 
noted that “the property was not of a type that could have been dismantled 
and removed before the agents had time to secure a warrant.”108
Discussing its search incident to arrest jurisprudence, the Court in 
Trupiano held that the right to conduct a search incident to arrest was 
“strictly limited” to cases where such a search was necessary.
 
109  Further, 
such necessity could not come from the mere existence of a lawful arrest, 
by itself.110  Instead, the Court held, there had to “be some other factor in 
the situation that would make it unreasonable or impracticable to require the 
arresting officer to equip himself with a search warrant.”111  Applying this 
legal standard to the facts before it, the Court held that “no reason whatever 
has been shown why the arresting officers could not have armed themselves 
during all the weeks of their surveillance of the locus with a duly obtained 
search warrant—no reason, that is, except indifference to the legal process 
for search and seizure which the Constitution contemplated.”112
 
102 Id. at 703–04. 
 
103 Id. at 704. 
104 Id. at 705. 
105 Id. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925); Go-Bart Importing Co. 
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931)). 
106 Id. at 706. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 708. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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The Court in Trupiano then went on to distinguish the case before it 
from Harris.  The Court explained that, unlike Harris, the case before it 
“relate[d] only to the seizure of contraband the existence and precise nature 
and location of which the law enforcement officers were aware long before 
making the lawful arrest.”113  The Court held that “[this] circumstance was 
wholly lacking in the Harris case, which was concerned with the 
permissible scope of a general search without a warrant as an incident to a 
lawful arrest.”114  The Court went on to state that while “the Harris case 
dealt with the seizure of Government property which could not have been 
the subject of a prior search warrant, it having been found unexpectedly 
during the course of a search,” the evidence seized in Trupiano “could 
easily have been specified in a prior search warrant.”115  The Court 
concluded that the factual differences between Harris and Trupiano were 
“enough to justify confining ourselves to the precise facts of this case, 
leaving it to another day to test the Harris situation by the rule that search 
warrants are to be obtained and used wherever reasonably practicable.”116
If Trupiano represented a major victory for civil libertarians, that 
victory was short-lived.
 
117  Only two years later, in United States v. 
Rabinowitz, the Supreme Court expressly overruled its holding in 
Trupiano.118  In Rabinowitz, federal agents obtained information that the 
defendant was dealing in stamps with forged overprints.119  Based on this 
information, the agents obtained a warrant for the defendant’s arrest.120
 
113 Id. 
  At 
the time they obtained the arrest warrant, the agents had reason to believe 
that the defendant probably possessed several thousand altered stamps 
114 Id. at 708–09. 
115 Id. at 709. 
116 Id. 
117 See Tomkovicz, supra note 71, at 1425. 
118 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).  In the two years between 
Trupiano and Rabinowitz, two of the Justices that joined the Trupiano majority—Justices 
Frank Murphy and Wiley Blount Rutledge—died.  See Justice Murphy Dies at 59 in Detroit 
of Heart Attack, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1949, at 1; Justice Wiley Rutledge Dies of Brain 
Hemorrhage at 55, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1949, at 1.  They were replaced by Justices Tom 
Clark and Sherman Minton, respectively.  See Mark Strasser, Religion in the Schools: On 
Prayer, Neutrality, and Sectarian Perspectives, 42 AKRON L. REV. 185, 201 (2009).  Both 
Justices Clark and Minton joined the majority in Rabinowitz.  Justice Douglas, another 
member of the Trupiano majority, did not participate in Rabinowitz.  Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 
66. 
119 Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 57–58. 
120 Id. at 58. 
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bearing forged overprints.121  After obtaining the arrest warrant, the agents 
went to the defendant’s one-room office and placed him under arrest.122  
Over the defendant’s objection, the agents searched his desk, safe, and 
filing cabinets for approximately an hour and a half.123  During their search, 
the agents “found and seized 573 stamps, on which it was later determined 
that overprints had been forged.”124
The defendant was indicted on two counts: one for selling four forged 
and altered stamps to an undercover agent, and the other for possessing, 
with intent to defraud, the 573 forged and altered stamps that were found 
during the search of his office.
 
125  He moved to suppress the evidence of the 
stamps found during the search on Fourth Amendment grounds, but his 
motion was denied by the district court.126  After he was convicted on both 
counts, the defendant appealed to the Second Circuit.  Relying on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Trupiano, the Second Circuit reversed his 
conviction on the ground that “since the officers had had time in which to 
procure a search warrant and had failed to do so the search was illegal, and 
the evidence therefore should have been excluded.”127
Undoubtedly to the surprise of many, the Court in Rabinowitz reversed 
the Second Circuit and affirmed the defendant’s conviction.
 
128  Discussing 
the history of its search incident to arrest jurisprudence, the Court in 
Rabinowitz noted that “[t]he right to search the person incident to arrest 
always has been recognized in this country and in England.  Where one had 
been placed in the custody of the law by valid action of officers, it was not 
unreasonable to search him.”129  Finding that the arrest at issue was valid 
due to the existence of an arrest warrant, the Court first concluded that the 
defendant’s person was lawfully searched, and then considered whether the 




  The Court noted that the defendant’s desk, safe, and filing 
cabinets were “all within plain sight of the parties, and all located under 
respondent’s immediate control in his one-room office open to the 
122 Id. 





128 Id. at 66. 
129 Id. at 60 (internal citation omitted). 
130 Id. at 60–61. 
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public[.]”131  The Court cited its decision in Marron with approval, and held 
that its subsequent decisions in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz did not drain Marron 
of “contemporary vitality.”132
Applying the law to the facts of the case before it, the Court in 
Rabinowitz held that the search in question “was not general or 
exploratory.”
 
133  Instead, the Court held, the officers had “probable cause to 
believe that respondent was conducting his business illegally,”134 and that 
the forged stamps were “in the possession of and concealed by respondent 
in the very room where he was arrested, over which room he had immediate 
control and in which he had been selling such stamps unlawfully.”135  The 
Court went on to hold that such a limited search was authorized by 
Harris.136
After concluding that the search at issue was reasonable,
 
137 the Court 
finally addressed Trupiano, acknowledging that, in that case, the Court 
“first enunciated the requirement that search warrants must be procured 
when ‘practicable’ in a case of search incident to arrest.”138  The Court held 
that, although “[a] rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be 
procured whenever practicable may be appealing from the vantage point of 
easy administration,” it could not agree “that this requirement should be 
crystallized into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search.”139
It is fallacious to judge events retrospectively and thus to determine, considering the 
time element alone, that there was time to procure a search warrant.  Whether there 
was time may well be dependent upon considerations other than the ticking off of 
minutes or hours.  The judgment of the officers as to when to close the trap on a 
criminal committing a crime in their presence or who they have reasonable cause to 
believe is committing a felony is not determined solely upon whether there was time 
to procure a search warrant.  Some flexibility will be accorded law officers engaged in 
daily battle with criminals for whose restraint criminal laws are essential.
  The 
Court went on to explain why the rule from Trupiano was unworkable: 
140
The Court concluded by overruling Trupiano insofar as it required “a search 
warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of procuring it rather than 
 
 
131 Id. at 61. 
132 Id. at 62. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 62–63. 
135 Id. at 63. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 63–64. 
138 Id. at 64. 
139 Id. at 65. 
140 Id. 
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upon the reasonableness of the search after a lawful arrest.”141  The Court 
held that the important consideration was the reasonableness of the search, 
not the reasonableness of procuring a search warrant.142  To determine the 
reasonableness of the search, “the total atmosphere of the case” had to be 
examined.143  As the Court would later note in Chimel v. California, 
“Rabinowitz [came] to stand for the proposition . . . that a warrantless 
search ‘incident to a lawful arrest’ may generally extend to the area that is 
considered to be in the ‘possession’ or under the ‘control’ of the person 
arrested.”144
The next landmark case in the Court’s search incident to arrest 
jurisprudence came in 1969, when the Court decided Chimel.
 
145  The 
officers in Chimel, armed with a warrant authorizing the defendant’s arrest 
for the burglary of a coin ship, arrived at the defendant’s home.146  After 
knocking on the front door and identifying themselves to the defendant’s 
wife, they were allowed inside, where they waited approximately fifteen 
minutes for the defendant to return home from work.147  When the 
defendant entered the house, one of the officers showed him the arrest 
warrant and asked if the officers could look around.148  Although the 
defendant objected, the officers advised him that they would nevertheless 
conduct a search “on the basis of the lawful arrest.”149  The officers in 
Chimel had not obtained a search warrant.150
The officers conducted a search of the entire three-bedroom house, 
including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop.
 
151  Although their 
search of some rooms “was relatively cursory,”152
 
141 Id. at 66. 
 while in the master 
bedroom and the sewing room, “the officers directed the petitioner’s wife to 
open drawers and ‘to physically move contents of the drawers from side to 
side so that [they] might view any items that would have come from [the] 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760 (1969). 
145 For a thorough discussion of the Court’s decision in Chimel, see Tomkovicz, supra 
note 71, at 1427–30. 
146 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 754. 
150 Id. at 754. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
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burglary.’”153  During the search, which lasted approximately forty-five 
minutes to an hour, the officers seized various coins, medals, tokens, and 
other objects.154  At trial, the defendant objected to the admission of those 
items into evidence, arguing that they had been unconstitutionally seized.155  
The trial court rejected the defendant’s argument and admitted the 
evidence.156  The defendant was subsequently convicted of burglary, and 
his conviction was affirmed by the state court of appeals and the state 
supreme court.157  Both courts held that, because the defendant’s arrest was 
lawful, the subsequent search was also lawful as incident to that arrest.158
Assuming, without deciding, that the defendant’s arrest was valid, the 
Supreme Court went directly to the question of whether the warrantless 
search of the defendant’s house was justified as incident to that arrest.
 
159  
The Court began with a discussion of the history of its search incident to 
arrest jurisprudence, noting from the outset that “[t]he decisions of this 
Court bearing upon that question have been far from consistent, as even the 
most cursory review makes evident.”160  After discussing the major cases 
from Weeks to Rabinowitz,161 the Court discussed the facts of the case 
before it and concluded that the search at issue was violative of the Fourth 
Amendment.162
The Court in Chimel held that, to the extent that Rabinowitz stood for 
the proposition “that a warrantless search ‘incident to a lawful arrest’ may 
generally extend to the area that is considered to be in the ‘possession’ or 
under the ‘control’ of the person arrested,” such a holding could withstand 
“neither historical nor rational analysis.”
 
163  The Chimel Court held that the 
Rabinowitz decision was “hardly founded on an unimpeachable line of 
authority”164 and that it disregarded “the approach taken in cases such as 
Go-Bart, Lefkowitz, and Trupiano.”165
 
153 Id. 
  The Chimel Court further held that 





158 Id. at 754–55. 
159 Id. at 755. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 755–760. 
162 Id. at 768. 
163 Id. at 760. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
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supported “by a reasoned view of the background and purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment.”166  It went on to discuss the utmost importance of the search 
warrant and held that “[c]learly, the general requirement that a search 
warrant be obtained is not lightly to be dispensed with, and ‘the burden is 
on those seeking [an] exemption [from the requirement] to show the need 
for it . . . .’”167
Applying the same analysis utilized by the Court in Terry v. Ohio,
 
168
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person 
arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to 
resist arrest or effect his escape.  Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be 
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.  In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the 
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order 
to prevent its concealment or destruction.  And the area into which an arrestee might 
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a 
like rule.  A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as 
dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person 
arrested.  There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person 
and the area “within his immediate control”—construing that phrase to mean the area 
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
 
which was decided one year prior to Chimel, the Court held: 
169
The Court then noted the lack of justification “for routinely searching any 
room other than that in which the arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for 
searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in 
that room itself.”
 
170  The Court held that such searches required a search 
warrant, absent the applicability of an exception to the warrant 
requirement.171
Moving on to Rabinowitz and Harris, the Court in Chimel held that the 
result of those two decisions was “to give law enforcement officials the 
opportunity to engage in searches not justified by probable cause, by the 






  After noting that “Rabinowitz and Harris ha[d] been the 
subject of critical commentary for many years, and ha[d] been relied upon 
167 Id. at 762 (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)). 
168 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  For an explanation of the holding in Terry v. Ohio, see infra note 
182. 
169 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 
(1964)). 
170 Id. at 763. 
171 Id. at 763 (quoting Katz v. United States, 347 U.S. 351, 357 (1967)). 
172 Id. at 767. 
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less and less in [the Court’s] own decisions,”173 the Court overruled both of 
those cases, holding that “insofar as the principles they stand for are 
inconsistent with those that we have endorsed today, they are no longer to 
be followed.”174
Finally, turning to the facts of the case before it, the Court reversed the 
defendant’s conviction, holding that that search in question “went far 
beyond the petitioner’s person and the area from within which he might 
have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as 
evidence against him.”
 
175  Because it was conducted without a warrant, the 
Court declared the search to be unreasonable.176
After Chimel, an officer, subsequent to an arrest, could search the 
arrestee “in order to remove any weapons” that the arrestee might use to 
resist arrest or escape,
 
177 and search for and seize any evidence on the 
arrestee’s person or in the arrestee’s “grab area”—“the area from within 
which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible 
evidence”—in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.178  However, 
an officer was not permitted to conduct a routine search of “any room other 
than that in which an arrest occurs,” or search “through all the desk drawers 
or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself,” absent some other 
exception to the warrant requirement.179
Since laying out the general rule to be followed in search-incident-to-
arrest cases in Chimel, the Court has had many opportunities to clarify that 
rule.  In United States v. Robinson, for instance, the Court upheld an 
officer’s full search of the defendant’s person after the defendant was 
placed under arrest for driving on a revoked license.
 
180  The Court discussed 
the two rationales behind allowing warrantless searches incident to arrest: 
“The justification or reason for the authority to search incident to a lawful 
arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect in order to take 
him into custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person 
for later use at trial.”181
 
173 Id. at 768. 
  Based on these “twin rationales,” the Court in 




177 Id. at 763. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
181 Id. at 234 (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 20 (1925)). 
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to lawful arrest are not, therefore, commuted to the stricter Terry 
standards182 by the absence of probable fruits or further evidence of the 
particular crime for which the arrest is made.”183
Nor are we inclined . . . to qualify the breadth of the general authority to search 
incident to a lawful custodial arrest on an assumption that persons arrested for the 
offense of driving while their licenses have been revoked are less likely to possess 
dangerous weapons than are those arrested for other crimes.  It is scarcely open to 
doubt that the danger to an officer is far greater in the case of the extended exposure 
which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police 
station than in the case of the relatively fleeting contact resulting from the typical 
Terry-type stop.  This is an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for 
purposes of search justification.
  The Court then stated: 
184
Finally, the Court in Robinson took issue with the circuit court’s 
suggestion that “there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or 
not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a 
search of the person incident to a lawful arrest.”
 
185  Rejecting this 
suggestion, the Court noted the “ad hoc” nature of a police officer’s 
determination of how and where to search a suspect and held that authority 
for such a search “does not depend on what a court may later decide was the 
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in 
fact be found upon the person of the suspect.”186  The Court went on to hold 
that “[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to 
search,”187 and that such a search is inherently reasonable.188
Since Chimel, the Court has also addressed the issue of the timing of a 
search incident to arrest on several occasions.  In Rawlings v. Kentucky, the 
Court upheld a search incident to arrest that preceded the actual arrest, 
holding that “[w]here the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the 
challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly 
  
 
182 In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may “stop and frisk” a 
suspect whom the officer has reason to believe is “armed and presently dangerous.”  392 
U.S. 1, 24 (1968).  The Court in Terry held that “the police must, whenever practicable, 
obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure” 
and that “the scope of [a] search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances 
which rendered its initiation permissible.”  Id. at 19–20 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)). 
183 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234.  
184 Id. at 234–35. 
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important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.”189  
Further, in several cases, the Court has upheld delayed searches of the 
arrestee or the things within the arrestee’s possession or control.  In United 
States v. Edwards, the Court upheld a search of the defendant’s possessions 
that occurred while he was in custody at the city jail approximately ten 
hours after his arrest.190
[O]nce the accused is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession 
at the place of detention that were subject to search at the time and place of his arrest 
may lawfully be searched and seized without a warrant even though a substantial 
period of time has elapsed between the arrest and subsequent administrative 
processing, on the one hand, and the taking of the property for use as evidence, on the 
other.
  The Court in Edwards held: 
191
As noted in more detail in the next two sections, since Chimel, the 
authority of law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless searches 
incident to arrest has expanded exponentially, with courts oftentimes losing 
sight of the twin rationales that justify these searches in the first place—the 
need to disarm the suspect and the need to preserve evidence.
 
192
B. AUTOMOBILES AND THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION 
 
1. Origins: New York v. Belton.   
Twelve years after Chimel was decided, the Court was asked to apply 
the rationale of Chimel in the context of an automobile search.  In New York 
v. Belton, the Court addressed the following question: “When the occupant 
of an automobile is subjected to a lawful custodial arrest, does the 
constitutionally permissible scope of a search incident to his arrest include 
the passenger compartment of the automobile in which he was riding?”193  
The Court answered that question in the affirmative.194





189 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980).  It is important to note that, in Rawlings, although the search 
at issue preceded any actual arrest, the officers did have probable cause to arrest the 
defendant before conducting the search.  Id. at 100–01. 
  After the officer asked to see the driver’s license and 
190 415 U.S. 800, 801, 810 (1974). 
191 Id. at 807. 
192 See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed: The Rise of a 
Public Place Exemption to the Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 389–97 
(1986) (discussing the expansion of the automobile exception post-Chimel). 
193 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981). 
194 Id. at 462–63. 
195 Id. at 455. 
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vehicle registration, he discovered that none of the men in the vehicle 
owned the vehicle or were related to the vehicle’s owner.196  The officer 
also smelled burnt marijuana and saw on the car’s floor an envelope marked 
“Supergold,” which he knew was associated with marijuana.197  The officer 
directed the men to get out of the car and placed them under arrest for 
possession of marijuana.198  After patting down each of the men, the officer 
split them up into four separate areas of the highway so that they would not 
be next to each other.199  He then picked up the envelope and found 
marijuana inside.200  After reading the men their Miranda warnings, the 
officer searched their persons and the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle.201  He found a jacket on the back seat of the vehicle belonging to 
the defendant and, when he unzipped one of the jacket’s pockets, he found 
cocaine.202  The officer then placed the defendant’s jacket in his patrol car 
and drove the four men to the police station.203
After being indicted for possession of a controlled substance, the 
defendant moved to suppress the cocaine seized by the officer.
 
204  The 
district court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress and the defendant 
pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense.205  On appeal, the state appeals 
court upheld the constitutionality of the search and seizure as a lawful 
search incident to arrest.206  However, the state supreme court reversed, 
holding that “[a] warrantless search of the zippered pockets of an 
unaccessible jacket may not be upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest 
where there is no longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate might 
gain access to the article.”207
The Court in Belton began with a discussion of its decision in Chimel, 
which it interpreted as holding that “a lawful custodial arrest creates a 
situation which justifies the contemporaneous search without a warrant of 





  The Court 
197 Id. at 455–56. 







205 Id.  
206 Id. 
207 People v. Belton, 407 N.E.2d 420, 421 (N.Y. 1980). 
208 Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981). 
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then discussed the “twin rationales” of Chimel—to remove any weapons 
from the arrestee and to prevent the concealment and destruction of 
evidence.209  In relation to those twin rationales, the Court had held that 
“‘[the] scope of [a] search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.’”210  The Court 
then noted that “[a]lthough the principle that limits a search incident to a 
lawful custodial arrest may be stated clearly enough, courts have discovered 
the principle difficult to apply in specific cases.”211
The Court then discussed the advantages of creating a bright-line rule 
to govern police conduct.  It noted that “‘[a] single familiar standard is 
essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise 
to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the 
specific circumstances they confront.’”
 
212  The Court recognized that, 
although bright-line rules had been created in other areas of search incident 
to arrest jurisprudence,213 no bright-line rule had yet been created in the 
automobile context.214  Pointing to the state of disarray that had been 
created by federal circuit and state courts over the issue before it,215 the 
Court warned that “[w]hen a person cannot know how a court will apply a 
settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the 
scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope 
of his authority.”216
After discussing the need for a bright-line rule in the automobile 
context, the Court in Belton held: 
 
Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively 
narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, 
even if not inevitably, within “the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to 
grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].”  In order to establish the workable rule this 
category of cases requires, we read Chimel’s definition of the limits of the area that 
may be searched in light of that generalization.  Accordingly, we hold that when a 
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he 
 
209 Id. 
210 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). 
211 Id. at 458. 
212 Id. (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979)). 
213 Id. at 459 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 459–60. 
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may, as a contemporaneous incident to that arrest, search the passenger compartment 
of that automobile.217
The Court also held that officers could search any containers found in a 
vehicle’s passenger compartment, regardless of whether such a container 
was open or closed.
  
218  Importantly, the Court in Belton defined the word 
“container” extremely broadly, as “any object capable of holding another 
object.  It thus includes closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or 
other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as 
well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.”219  The Court noted, 
however, that its holding “encompasse[d] only the interior of the passenger 
compartment of an automobile and d[id] not encompass the trunk.”220
As if its holding was not broad enough already, and seemingly losing 
sight of the twin rationales justifying searches incident to arrest laid out in 
Chimel, the Court in Belton recognized “that these containers will 
sometimes be such that they could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of 
the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested.”
 
221  Despite this 
acknowledgement, the Court held that such containers could nevertheless 
be searched because the appropriateness of such a search could not depend 
on a court’s subsequent hindsight determination of the probability that 
weapons or evidence would be found.222
In concluding that the search at issue was constitutionally valid, the 
Court noted that the searched jacket was located in the passenger 
compartment of the car in which the defendant had been a passenger just 




217 Id. at 460 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)) (citation omitted).  
In a footnote, the Court in Belton clarified its holding: “Our holding today does no more than 
determine the meaning of Chimel’s principles in this particular and problematic context.  It 
in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the 
basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.”  Id. at 460 n.3. 
  Apparently not finding it relevant that, at the 
time of the actual search, the defendant was nowhere near the vehicle’s 
218 Id. at 460–61. 
219 Id. at 460 n.4. 
220 Id.  As discussed more below, this limitation has little practical effect.  This is 
because police may search a vehicle’s trunk as part of an inventory search subsequent to 
arrest.  See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 370 (1987).  The availability of inventory 
searches, combined with the inevitable discovery rule, see, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 
431, 446 (1984), means that courts will often uphold the search of a locked trunk despite the 
limitation discussed in Belton.  See infra note 378 (discussing Nix v. Williams). 
221 Belton, 453 U.S. at 461. 
222 Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). 
223 Id. at 462. 
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passenger compartment,224 the Court held that “[t]he jacket was thus within 
the area which we have concluded was ‘within the arrestee’s immediate 
control’ within the meaning of the Chimel case.”225
The dissent in Belton, authored by Justice Brennan and joined by 
Justice Marshall, criticized the majority’s opinion for ignoring the twin 
rationales that justified searches incident to arrest in the first place, calling 
the majority’s bright-line rule arbitrary.
 
226  Noting that the Chimel 
exception was narrowly tailored to address the twin concerns discussed in 
that case,227 the dissenters stated that Chimel “places a temporal and a 
spatial limitation on searches incident to arrest, excusing compliance with 
the warrant requirement only when the search ‘is substantially 
contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity 
of the arrest.’”228  In a statement that would eventually become the law 
nearly thirty years later,229 Justice Brennan stated, “When the arrest has 
been consummated and the arrestee safely taken into custody, the 
justifications underlying Chimel’s limited exception to the warrant 
requirement cease to apply: at that point there is no possibility that the 
arrestee could reach weapons or contraband.”230
Justice Brennan referred to the majority’s belief that the interior of a 
car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee who had recently 
been in that car as a fiction,
 
231 and stated that the majority “substantially 
expands the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest by permitting 
police officers to search areas and containers the arrestee could not possibly 
reach at the time of arrest.”232  In conclusion, Justice Brennan opined that 
the majority was establishing a “dangerous precedent,” which was contrary 
to Chimel and the Court’s other search-incident-to-arrest cases, as well as to 
the doctrine of stare decisis and the Fourth Amendment itself.233
 
224 In his dissent, Justice Brennan cited the state court’s recitation of the facts, which 
clearly indicate that the search in question came after the defendant was placed under arrest 
outside of the searched vehicle.  Id. at 467 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
  In a 
separate dissenting opinion, Justice White expressed his belief that, with 
respect to a container located in an automobile, there exists a separate 
225 Id. at 462 (majority opinion). 
226 Id. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
227 Id. at 464–65. 
228 Id. at 465 (quoting Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819 (1969)). 
229 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009). 
230 Belton, 453 U.S. at 465–66 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
231 Id. at 466. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 468–69. 
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interest of privacy, and that, even when the police are justified in 
conducting a search of the vehicle incident to arrest, they are not necessarily 
also justified in searching containers found therein.234
After Belton, upon arresting the occupant of an automobile, a police 
officer was permitted, incident to that arrest, to search the vehicle’s 
passenger compartment.
 
235  An officer could also “examine the contents of 
any containers found within the passenger compartment,” whether the 
container was open or closed, including glove compartments, consoles, 
luggage, boxes, bags, and clothing.236  This was true even if the container in 
question was “such that [it] could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the 
criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested.”237
2. Limiting Belton: Knowles v. Iowa 
 
The Court’s decision in Belton dealt only with situations where a 
custodial arrest was made.  Seventeen years later, the Court was asked to 
decide whether police could lawfully search a vehicle’s passenger 
compartment when the driver is given a citation instead of being placed 
under arrest.  In Knowles v. Iowa, a police officer stopped the defendant for 
speeding, but chose to issue him a citation rather than placing him under 
arrest.238  After issuing the citation, the officer conducted a full search of 
the defendant’s car.239  Under the driver’s seat, the officer found a bag of 
marijuana and a pipe.240  The defendant was arrested and charged with 
possession of a controlled substance.241
Before trial, Knowles moved to suppress the evidence obtained during 
the search, arguing that the search could not be sustained under the search 
incident to arrest exception because he had not actually been placed under 
arrest.
 
242  The officer admitted at the suppression hearing that he had neither 
the defendant’s consent nor probable cause to conduct the search.243
 
234 Id. at 472 (White, J., dissenting). 
  Based 
on a state law that permitted an officer to conduct what the court referred to 
as a “search incident to citation,” the trial court denied the defendant’s 
235 Id. at 460. 
236 Id. at 460–61 & n.4. 
237 Id. at 461. 
238 525 U.S. 113, 114 (1998).  The Court in Knowles noted that the officer had the right, 





243 Id. at 114–15. 
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motion to suppress and found him guilty.244  The state supreme court 
affirmed.245
In a unanimous decision reversing the state supreme court and finding 
that the search at issue was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, 
the Court in Knowles began by discussing the twin rationales of Chimel and 
holding that neither rationale justified the search in question.
 
246  Although 
the Court recognized the legitimacy and importance of the first rationale—
officer safety247—it went on to note that the threat associated with issuing a 
traffic citation was not as great as the threat associated with an arrest.248  
The Court held that “while the concern for officer safety in this context may 
justify the ‘minimal’ additional intrusion of ordering a driver and 
passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably 
greater intrusion attending a full field-type search.”249
The Court in Knowles noted that, even without the search authority 
urged by the state in the case before it, officers had other ways to protect 
themselves: An officer could order individuals to exit a vehicle, conduct 
pat-downs with reasonable suspicion, and conduct full searches pursuant to 
an arrest.
 
250  As to the second justification behind the search incident to 
arrest exception—the need to discover and preserve evidence—the Court in 
Knowles concluded that the state had not shown the presence of this 
concern either.251  Specifically, the Court held that “[o]nce Knowles was 
stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to 
prosecute that offense had been obtained.  No further evidence of excessive 
speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the 
passenger compartment of the car.”252
After Knowles, police officers were no longer permitted to conduct 





244 Id. at 115. 
  Officers could still, however, order a vehicle’s occupants to exit 
the vehicle and perform a Terry pat-down on those occupants if there 
245 Id. at 115–16. 
246 Id. at 116–17. 
247 Id. at 117 (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412 (1997)). 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 117–18. 
251 Id. at 118. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 117. 
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existed reasonable suspicion that an occupant was dangerous and might 
gain immediate control of a weapon.254
3. Expanding Belton: Thornton v. United States 
 
If civil libertarians and defense attorneys criticized the Supreme 
Court’s expansive holding in Belton, then they surely savaged the Court 
when it expanded that holding even further twenty-three years later in 
Thornton v. United States.255  The Court in Thornton granted certiorari to 
determine “whether Belton’s rule is limited to situations where the officer 
makes contact with the occupant while the occupant is inside the vehicle, or 
whether it applies as well when the officer first makes contact with the 
arrestee after the latter has stepped out of his vehicle.”256  The Court 
concluded that “Belton governs even when an officer does not make contact 
until the person arrested has left the vehicle.”257
The defendant in Thornton was driving a vehicle when he came upon a 
police car traveling in the same direction.
 
258  The officer grew suspicious 
when the defendant slowed down so as to avoid driving next to the 
officer.259  After running a check on the defendant’s license plates, the 
officer learned that the tags had been issued to another vehicle.260  After the 
defendant drove into a parking lot, parked, and got out of the car, the officer 
approached him and asked for his driver’s license.261  Because the 
defendant appeared nervous, and out of concern for his safety, the officer 
conducted a pat-down search of the defendant’s person, to which the 
defendant had consented.262  That pat-down search resulted in the discovery 
of both marijuana and cocaine on the defendant’s person.263  The officer 
handcuffed the defendant, informed him that he was under arrest, and 
placed him in the back seat of his patrol car.264
 
254 Id. at 118. 
  The officer then conducted 
255 541 U.S. 615 (2004); see Tomkovicz, supra note 71, at 1437 (discussing continuing 
expansion of exception between Belton and Thornton). 
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a search of the defendant’s vehicle and found a handgun under the driver’s 
seat.265
After being indicted on the charges of possession of cocaine, 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, the defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence of the firearm as the fruit of an unconstitutional search.
 
266  The 
district court denied this motion, holding that the search was constitutional 
pursuant to Belton and, alternatively, that the officer could have conducted 
an inventory search.267  After the defendant was convicted and sentenced to 
180 months in prison, he appealed, arguing that Belton only applied where 
the initial contact by the officer with the arrestee occurred while the arrestee 
was still in the vehicle.268  The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument and 
held that the justifications for searches incident to arrest did not necessitate 
such a limitation.269
Affirming the Fourth Circuit, the Court in Thornton began its analysis 
by discussing the rules from Chimel and Belton.
 
270  The Court noted that, in 
declaring the search at issue in Belton constitutional, the Court in that case 
did not focus on the fact that the officer made contact with the suspects 
while they were still in the vehicle.271
Nor do we find such a factor persuasive in distinguishing the current situation, as it 
bears no logical relationship to Belton’s rationale.  There is simply no basis to 
conclude that the span of the area generally within the arrestee’s immediate control is 
determined by whether the arrestee exited the vehicle at the officer’s direction, or 
whether the officer initiated contact with him while he remained in the car . . . . 
  The Court continued: 
In all relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents 
identical concerns regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence as the arrest 
of one who is inside the vehicle . . . .  The stress is no less merely because the arrestee 
exited his car before the officer initiated contact, nor is an arrestee less likely to 
attempt to lunge for a weapon or to destroy evidence if he is outside of, but still in 
control of, the vehicle.272
The Court in Thornton went on to note that “Belton allows police to 





267 Id. at 618–19. 
268 Id. at 619. 
269 Id. (quoting United States v. Thornton, 325 F.3d 189, 195–96 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
270 Id. at 620. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 620–21. 
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arrest of both ‘occupants’ and ‘recent occupants.’”273
Indeed, the respondent in Belton was not inside the car at the time of the arrest and 
search; he was standing on the highway.  In any event, while an arrestee’s status as a 
“recent occupant” may turn on his temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the 
time of the arrest and search, it certainly does not turn on whether he was inside or 
outside the car at the moment that the officer first initiated contact with him.
  The Court further 
observed that: 
274
Interestingly, the majority in Thornton expressly acknowledged a flaw 
in its rationale: “To be sure, not all contraband in the passenger 
compartment is likely to be readily accessible to a ‘recent occupant.’  It is 
unlikely in this case that petitioner could have reached under the driver’s 
seat for his gun once he was outside of his automobile.”
 
275  However, the 
Court held that a bright-line rule was nevertheless needed.276  In conclusion, 
the majority in Thornton set forth the following rule: “So long as an arrestee 
is the sort of ‘recent occupant’ of a vehicle such as petitioner was here, 
officers may search that vehicle incident to the arrest.”277
Justice Scalia filed a concurrence in Thornton, which was joined by 
Justice Ginsburg.
 
278  In his concurrence, Justice Scalia opined that Belton 
should not be expanded to include situations in which the arrestee was 
handcuffed and secured in the back of a patrol car at the time of the 
search.279  He noted that “[t]he risk that [the defendant in this case] would 
nevertheless ‘grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]’ from his car was remote 
in the extreme,”280 and that “[t]he Court’s effort to apply our current 
doctrine to this search stretches it beyond its breaking point.”281  In Justice 
Scalia’s opinion, the search at issue instead could have been upheld as a 
“more general sort of evidence-gathering search” permitted by cases like 
Rabinowitz.282
 
273 Id. at 622 (emphasis added). 
  He cited a variety of cases that referred to “the general 
interest in gathering evidence related to the crime of arrest with no mention 
of the more specific interest in preventing its concealment or 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. at 622–23. 
277 Id. at 623–24. 
278 Justice O’Connor filed a separate concurrence, criticizing the willingness of lower 
courts to expand Belton where the twin rationales justifying searches incident to arrest were 
not present.  Id. at 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
279 Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
280 Id. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. at 629. 
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destruction.”283  He concluded by stating that it was reasonable for the 
officer in Thornton “to believe that further contraband or similar evidence 
relevant to the crime for which [the defendant] had been arrested might be 
found in the vehicle from which he had just alighted and which was still 
within his vicinity at the time of arrest,”284 and that the circuit court’s 
decision should have been affirmed on this ground.285  Justice Scalia also 
opined that Belton should be limited to cases “where it is reasonable to 
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the 
vehicle.”286
Dissenting, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, stated that the 
search at issue was not justified by Chimel or Belton.
 
287  According to 
Justice Stevens, “Belton was demonstrably concerned only with the narrow 
but common circumstance of a search occasioned by the arrest of a suspect 
who was seated in or driving an automobile at the time the law enforcement 
official approached.”288  He continued by stating that “[t]he bright-line rule 
crafted in Belton is not needed for cases in which the arrestee is first 
accosted when he is a pedestrian, because Chimel itself provides all the 
guidance that is necessary.”289  He also pointed out some of the flaws in the 
majority’s decision, including the majority’s failure to clarify exactly what 
degree of temporal or special relationship with a vehicle would be required 
to justify a search.290  Justice Stevens noted that this lack of clarity would 
lead to the subject of a search not knowing if or how he is protected by the 
Constitution, and to a law enforcement officer not knowing the limits of his 
authority.291  Justice Stevens concluded by stating: “Without some limiting 
principle, I fear that today’s decision will contribute to ‘a massive 
broadening of the automobile exception,’ when officers have probable 
cause to arrest an individual but not to search his car.”292
After Thornton, an officer could conduct a vehicle search incident to 
arrest even when the occupants exited the vehicle prior to the officer 
 
 
283 Id. at 629–30. 
284 Id. at 632. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. at 634 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
288 Id. at 635. 
289 Id. at 636. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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initiating contact.293  This rule applied regardless of the likelihood that the 
vehicle’s recent occupants could reach for a weapon or contraband.294
4. The Effect of Belton and Thornton on Automobile Searches Incident to 
Arrest 
 
In the years following Belton and Thornton, the concerns expressed by 
Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Thornton seem to have come 
true.  In case after case, lower courts upheld searches conducted well after 
the arrestee was placed under arrest, handcuffed, and secured.295  In United 
States v. Hrasky, for example, the Eighth Circuit upheld a search conducted 
an hour after the arrestee was apprehended and after he had been 
handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car.296  Similarly, in United 
States v. Weaver, the Ninth Circuit upheld a search conducted ten to fifteen 
minutes after the arrest was made, again after the arrestee had already been 
handcuffed and secured in the back of a police vehicle.297
Although contemporaneity is important, we have made clear that it is not the sole 
inquiry.  “The relevant distinction turns not upon the moment of arrest versus the 
moment of the search but upon whether the arrest and search are so separated in time 
or by intervening acts that the latter cannot be said to have been incident to the 
former.”  Indeed, “[t]here is no fixed outer limit for the number of minutes that may 
pass between an arrest and a valid, warrantless search that is a contemporaneous 
incident of the arrest.”
  In support of this 
holding, the Ninth Circuit stated: 
298
Although the Ninth Circuit suggested that the Supreme Court should 
re-examine its holding in Belton because “the Belton rule [was] broader 
than its stated rationale,”
 
299 it nevertheless felt compelled to uphold the 
search at issue pursuant to Belton and its progeny.300  Moreover, in dozens 
of other cases, courts upheld searches incident to arrest that were conducted 
after the arrestee was already handcuffed and secured in a patrol car.301
 
293 Id. at 620–21. 
  A 
294 Id. at 622–23. 
295 See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1718 n.2 (2009) (collecting circuit cases). 
296 453 F.3d 1099, 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 2006). 
297 433 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006). 
298 Id. at 1106 (citations omitted). 
299 Id. at 1107. 
300 Id. 
301 See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 221 F. App’x 715, 717 (10th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Williams, 170 F. App’x 399, 401 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 
1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Osife, 398 F.3d 1143, 1144 (9th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Sumrall, 115 F. App’x 22, 24 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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few years later, however, the Supreme Court followed the Ninth Circuit’s 
advice and revisited its holding in Belton. 
III. REINING IT IN: ARIZONA V. GANT 
Just when one might have thought that a police officer’s authority to 
search an automobile incident to a custodial arrest had no limits, the 
Supreme Court issued its decision in Arizona v. Gant.302  Based on an 
anonymous tip that drugs were being sold from a particular residence, the 
officers in Gant traveled to that residence and encountered the defendant as 
he drove his car into the driveway.303  Based on a previous encounter with 
the defendant earlier that day, the officers knew that the defendant’s license 
had been suspended and that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest 
for driving with a suspended license.304  After the officers confirmed that 
the driver of the car was the defendant by shining a flashlight into the car as 
it drove by, the defendant parked at the end of the driveway, got out of his 
car, and shut the door.305  One of the officers called to the defendant and 
after they approached each other, the officer immediately placed the 
defendant under arrest and handcuffed him.306  After additional officers 
arrived on the scene, the defendant was placed in the back seat of a patrol 
car.307
After the defendant had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a 
patrol car, the officers searched his vehicle, finding a gun and a bag of 
cocaine.
 
308  The bag of cocaine was found in the pocket of a jacket located 
in the back seat.309  After being charged with two drug offenses, the 
defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on Fourth 
Amendment grounds.310  The defendant argued that the search was not 
authorized by Belton “because he posed no threat to the officers after he 
was handcuffed in the patrol car and because he was arrested for a traffic 
offense for which no evidence could be found in his vehicle.”311
 
302 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
  The trial 
court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the search was 
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permissible as a search incident to arrest.312  The defendant was found 
guilty by a jury and sentenced to three years in prison.313
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the trial court, 
concluding that the search conducted was unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.
 
314  The Arizona Supreme Court discussed Belton, but 
distinguished Belton from the case before it.315  The court held that the 
analysis in Belton did not apply where, as in the case at bar, the search 
occurred after the scene was secure.316
[W]hen . . . the justifications underlying Chimel no longer exist because the scene is 
secure and the arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol car, and under 
the supervision of an officer, the warrantless search of the arrestee’s car cannot be 
justified as necessary to protect the officers at the scene or prevent the destruction of 
evidence.
  Citing Chimel’s twin rationales, the 
Arizona Supreme Court held: 
317
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the 
state supreme court by a margin of five to four.  The majority opinion was 
authored by Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, 
Thomas, and Ginsburg.  Justice Scalia also filed a concurring opinion.  Two 
dissenting opinions were filed: one by Justice Breyer and another by Justice 
Alito, the latter of which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Kennedy and, in part, by Justice Breyer.  The majority in Gant began its 
discussion by noting that “[t]he chorus that has called for us to revisit 
Belton includes courts, scholars, and Members of this Court who have 
questioned that decision’s clarity and its fidelity to Fourth Amendment 
principles.”
 
318  The Court then went through a history of its search incident 
to arrest jurisprudence, including its decisions in Chimel and Belton.319
Citing the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of its holding in 
Belton, the Court in Gant stated: 
 
The Arizona Supreme Court read our decision in Belton as merely delineating “the 
proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile” incident to an arrest.  That 




314 Id. (citing State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 644 (Ariz. 2007)). 
315 Gant, 162 P.3d at 642–43. 
316 Id. at 643. 
317 Id. at 644. 
318 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716. 
319 Id. at 1716–18. 
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supplies the generalization that the entire compartment and any containers therein 
may be reached.320
The Court continued: 
 
Despite the textual and evidentiary support for the Arizona Supreme Court’s reading 
of Belton, our opinion has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident 
to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain 
access to the vehicle at the time of the search.321
Discussing the effects of Belton, the Court in Gant echoed the 
concerns expressed by Justice O’Connor in her Thornton concurrence—that 
“lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle 
incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than 
as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel.”
 
322
The Court went on to criticize the prevailing interpretation of its 
decision in Belton: 
 
Under this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle search would be authorized incident to 
every arrest of a recent occupant notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle’s 
passenger compartment will not be within the arrestee’s reach at the time of the 
search.  To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent 
occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying the 
Chimel exception—a result clearly incompatible with our statement in Belton that it 
“in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding 
the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.”323
The Court expressly rejected this broad interpretation of Belton and 
held that “the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident 
to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within 
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the 
search.”
 
324  In a footnote, the Court noted that “[b]ecause officers have 
many means of ensuring the safe arrest of vehicle occupants, it will be the 
rare case in which an officer is unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a 
real possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle remains.”325  Next, the 
Court held that “circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search 
incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”326
 
320 Id. at 1718 (citation omitted). 
  The Court 
noted that, “[i]n many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a 
321 Id. 
322 Id. (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
323 Id. at 1719 (internal citations omitted). 
324 Id. 
325 Id. at 1719 n.4. 
326 Id. at 1719 (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
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traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle 
contains relevant evidence.”327  “But in others,” the Court continued, 
“including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for 
searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any 
containers therein.”328
Turning to the facts of the case before it, the Court in Gant held that 
“[n]either the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering 
offense-related evidence authorized the search in this case.”
 
329  The Court 
explained that Gant “clearly was not within reaching distance of his car at 
the time of the search,”330 and that the offense for which Gant was 
arrested—driving with a suspended license—was “an offense for which 
police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of 
Gant’s car.”331  The Court found that, “[b]ecause police could not 
reasonably have believed either that Gant could have accessed his car at the 
time of the search or that evidence of the offense for which he was arrested 
might have been found therein, the search in this case was unreasonable.”332
The Court in Gant rejected the state’s argument that Belton searches 
were reasonable regardless of the possibility of access, holding that the state 
“seriously undervalue[d] the privacy interests at stake,”
 
333 and 
“exaggerate[d] the clarity that its reading of Belton provides.”334  The Court 
held that, contrary to the state’s suggestion, “a broad reading of Belton is 
also unnecessary to protect law enforcement safety and evidentiary 
interests.”335
Under our view, Belton and Thornton permit an officer to conduct a vehicle search 
when an arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle or it is reasonable to 
believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.  Other established 
exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search under additional 
circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns demand . . . . 
  The Court explained: 
These exceptions together ensure that officers may search a vehicle when genuine 
safety or evidentiary concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle’s recent 







331 Id. (citing Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998)). 
332 Id. 
333 Id. at 1720. 
334 Id. 
335 Id. at 1721. 
336 Id. 
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Finally, the Court responded to the dissenters’ accusation that the 
majority was ignoring the doctrine of stare decisis.337  Although it 
recognized the importance of stare decisis, the majority held that it could 
not rely on the doctrine “to justify the continuance of an unconstitutional 
police practice,”338 and that it “would be particularly loath to uphold an 
unconstitutional result in a case that is so easily distinguished from the 
decisions that arguably compel it.”339  The majority also rejected the 
dissenters’ argument that “consideration of police reliance interests 
require[d] a different result,” 340 holding that “[i]f it is clear that a practice is 
unlawful, individuals’ interest in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any 
law enforcement ‘entitlement’ to its persistence.”341
Concurring, Justice Scalia focused on “traditional standards of 
reasonableness,”
 
342 and stated that “those standards do not justify what I 
take to be the rule set forth in [Belton] and [Thornton]: that arresting 
officers may always search an arrestee’s vehicle in order to protect 
themselves from hidden weapons.”343
When an arrest is made in connection with a roadside stop, police virtually always 
have a less intrusive and more effective means of ensuring their safety—and a means 
that is virtually always employed: ordering the arrestee away from the vehicle, patting 
him down in the open, handcuffing him, and placing him in the squad car.
  Justice Scalia went on to state: 
344
Although Justice Scalia recognized that police officers face a risk of 
being shot whenever they initiate a traffic stop, he went on to note that the 
risk “is not at all reduced by allowing a search of the stopped vehicle after 
the driver has been arrested and placed in the squad car.”
 
345  Justice Scalia 
noted that the state had “failed to provide a single instance in which a 
formerly restrained arrestee escaped to retrieve a weapon from his own 
vehicle.”346
Despite agreeing with the majority’s outcome, however, Justice Scalia 
disagreed with its reasoning.  Specifically, he stated that Belton and 
Thornton should be overruled and that a new rule should be established 
under which “a vehicle search incident to arrest is ipso facto ‘reasonable’ 
 
 




341 Id. at 1723. 
342 Id. at 1724 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
343 Id. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. (emphasis in original). 
346 Id. 
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only when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for which the 
arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer has probable cause to 
believe occurred.”347  Justice Scalia explained that, under his proposed rule, 
the search at issue in Gant would be deemed unlawful.348  As to the 
dissenters’ stare decisis argument, Justice Scalia stated that there was 
“ample reason” for abandoning prior precedent in this context: “the 
precedent was badly reasoned and produces erroneous (in this case 
unconstitutional) results.”349
Dissenting, Justice Breyer stated that the Court’s holding in Belton was 
“best read as setting forth a bright-line rule that permits a warrantless search 
of the passenger compartment of an automobile incident to the lawful arrest 
of an occupant—regardless of the danger the arrested individual in fact 
poses.”
 
350  Because of his belief that “the rule c[ould] produce results 
divorced from its underlying Fourth Amendment rationale,”351 Justice 
Breyer stated that he “would look for a better rule—were the question 
before us one of first impression.”352  However, he went on to state that the 
question was not one of first impression “and that fact makes a substantial 
difference.”353  Based on the doctrine of stare decisis, Justice Breyer 
expressed his unwillingness to abandon a well-established legal precedent 
that had been relied upon considerably by other courts.354
Justice Alito’s separate dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, 
Justice Kennedy, and in part by Justice Breyer, expressed concern that the 
majority’s holding might “endanger arresting officers,”
 
355 “confuse law 
enforcement officers and judges for some time to come,”356 and “cause the 
suppression of evidence gathered in many searches carried out in good-faith 
reliance on well-settled case law.”357
 
347 Id. at 1724–25. 
  Justice Alito criticized the majority’s 
attempt at narrowing the holding of Belton, and stated that Belton stood for 
348 Id. at 1725. 
349 Id. 
350 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
351 Id. 
352 Id. at 1725–26. 
353 Id. at 1726. 
354 Id. 
355 Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
356 Id. 
357 Id. 
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the broader proposition that arresting officers “may always search an 
arrestee’s vehicle in order to protect themselves.”358
IV. GANT’S AFTERMATH AND INEVITABLE DISCOVERY 
 
Pursuant to the majority’s holding in Gant, a police officer may search 
a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest in only two situations: (1) “if 
the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the 
time of the search”;359 or (2) if “it is reasonable to believe the vehicle 
contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”360  The first category excludes 
any arrestee who is handcuffed or otherwise secured or outside of reaching 
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.361  As the 
Court itself noted in Gant, “[b]ecause officers have many means of 
ensuring the safe arrest of vehicle occupants,” it will be the rare situation 
where this is not the case.362  Therefore, in practical effect, Gant limits 
lawful searches incident to arrest to the second category, which excludes 
arrests for traffic violations or other offenses for which evidence would not 
reasonably be found in the vehicle.363
In theory, the Court’s holding in Gant represents a landmark in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  After twenty-eight years of expanding police 
authority in the context of automobile searches incident to arrest, the Court 
finally placed a significant limitation on the scope of permissible police 
activity.  And the Court did so out of concern over and respect for the 




358 Id. at 1727.  Justice Alito also criticized the majority for abandoning Belton’s bright-
line rule, and stated that the majority could not justify its departure from the normal rule of 
stare decisis.  Id.  He also criticized the majority for “leav[ing] the law relating to searches 
incident to arrest in a confused and unstable state.”  Id. at 1731. 
  
359 Id. at 1723. 
360 Id. 
361 Id. at 1719 & n.4. 
362 Id. at 1719. 
363 Id.  It remains open whether an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs would fall into the same category as other traffic violations that do not permit searches 
incident to arrest.  There is an argument that the second holding in Gant would include these 
types of arrests because, unlike arrests for driving on a suspended license, it might be 
reasonable to believe that the vehicle contains evidence related to the offense of arrest such 
as open containers of alcohol, drugs, or drug paraphernalia.  See Eric H. Sills & Erin H. 
Gerstenzang, Column: DWI, CHAMPION MAG., December 2009, at *56.   On the other hand, 
because possession is not an element of driving under the influence, it could be argued that 
such evidence, even if found, would not be “evidence of the offense of arrest.”  The author 
could not find any cases discussing Gant’s effect on DUI arrests.  As this is not the focus of 
this Article, it is enough to raise the issue without further analysis. 
364 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720. 
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However, in the months following the Court’s decision in Gant, it became 
clear that the Court’s landmark decision left something to be desired in 
terms of practical real-world effect.  This is because in order to avoid 
exclusion of evidence based on the Court’s holding in Gant, it is often only 
necessary for the government or police to characterize the search, post hoc, 
as an inventory search rather than a search incident to arrest, or to argue that 
the tainted evidence should not be excluded because it inevitably would 
have been discovered during a later inventory search. 
In South Dakota v. Opperman, the Supreme Court held that, as long as 
certain safeguards are met, the police may, consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, conduct a warrantless search of an arrestee’s vehicle as part of 
the impoundment procedure.365  In order for an inventory search to be 
lawful, the subject vehicle “must first be in the lawful custody of the 
police,” and the “search must be conducted pursuant to standardized police 
procedures.”366  The Court has stated that inventory searches “serve to 
protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure 
against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard police 
from danger.”367  Based on these legitimate interests, the Court has 
“accorded deference to police caretaking procedures designed to secure and 
protect vehicles and their contents within police custody.”368  Because of 
the nature of the very specific interests justifying inventory searches, 
however, courts have held that the purpose of an inventory search “must be 
to identify and secure personal property inside the vehicle and not to gather 
incriminating evidence against the vehicle’s occupants.”369
After Opperman was decided, several lower federal and state courts 
attempted to limit the authority of police to conduct inventory searches.  For 
instance, the Supreme Court of Colorado once deemed an inventory search 
unlawful where the arrestee could have made alternative arrangements for 




365 428 U.S. 364, 374–75 (1976). 
  Reversing the Supreme Court of 
Colorado, however, the United States Supreme Court noted that “[t]he 
reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily 
366 United States v. Battle, No. 09-4169, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5427, at *7 (4th Cir. 
Mar. 16, 2010). 
367 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987). 
368 Id. 
369 Battle, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5427, at *7.  For a more detailed history of the 
inventory search exception to the warrant requirement, see Steven M. Christenson, Colorado 
v. Bertine Opens the Inventory Search to Containers, 73 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1998). 
370 People v. Bertine, 706 P.2d 411, 418 (Colo. 1985), rev’d, 479 U.S. 367 (1987). 
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or invariably turn on the existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.”371  
The Court held that “reasonable police regulations relating to inventory 
procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even 
though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally 
reasonable rules requiring a different procedure.”372
Although the Court has repeatedly held that, in order to be lawful, an 
inventory search must “be conducted according to standardized criteria,”
 
373 
this does not mean that an officer cannot be given discretion to choose 
between several reasonable alternatives.  In Bertine, the petitioner argued 
that the inventory search of his vehicle was unconstitutional because 
“departmental regulations gave the police officers discretion to choose 
between impounding his van and parking and locking it in a public parking 
place.”374  The Court rejected this argument, holding that “[n]othing in 
Opperman . . . prohibits the exercise of police discretion so long as that 
discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of 
something other than suspicion of criminal activity.”375  In terms of scope, 
inventory searches are similar to the searches incident to arrest that were 
permitted under Belton.  Not only can police search the passenger 
compartment of the impounded vehicle but, so long as department policy 
allows it, they may also search any containers located within the vehicle, 
whether open or closed.376  Police may also search a locked trunk during an 
inventory search.377
The Court’s holding in Gant, while severely limiting searches incident 
to arrest, did nothing to affect the availability or scope of inventory 
searches.  If the subject vehicle is in the lawful custody of the police, and 
the search is conducted pursuant to standardized police procedures, police 
may conduct a search of the vehicle’s passenger compartment, trunk, and 
any containers located therein, whether open or closed, as part of their 
impoundment procedures.  Post-Gant, even if a police officer conducts a 
search that is not authorized as a search incident to arrest, the prosecution 
 
 
371 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)). 
372 Id. 
373 Id. at 374 n.6. 
374 Id. at 375. 
375 Id. 
376 Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990); see Christenson, supra note 369, at 783. 
377 United States v. Wright, No. 4:08-cr-18, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19676, at *16 (E.D. 
Tenn. Feb. 5, 2010) (citing United States v. Jemison, 310 F. App’x 866, 871 (6th Cir. 2009)); 
see also United States v. Long, 705 F.2d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 893 
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 968 (1978). 
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can argue that the evidence found during such a search inevitably would 
have been discovered during a later inventory search and, therefore, should 
not be suppressed.378  Provided the prosecution can establish this by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the tainted evidence will be admissible 
notwithstanding its illegality under Gant.379
In many recent cases, lower courts have avoided application of Gant 
either by characterizing the search at issue as an inventory search rather 
than a search incident to arrest, or by holding that the evidence inevitably 
would have been discovered during a later inventory search.
 
380  The former 
approach was taken by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Sand.381  In 
Sand, there was a question as to whether the search at issue was a search 
incident to arrest or an inventory search.382  Although the search was 
characterized as a search incident to arrest in some places in the record, in 
concluding that the search was a permissible inventory search, the court in 
Sand focused on the fact that the officer who conducted the search testified 
that it was an inventory search and that the vehicle was being prepared for 
towing.383  The court acknowledged that, had the search been a search 
incident to arrest as opposed to an inventory search, it may have been illegal 
under Gant.384
The latter approach—using the inevitable discovery rule to save 
evidence discovered during a search that is otherwise illegal under Gant—
 
 
378 In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) [hereinafter Williams II], the Court 
established the inevitable discovery rule, holding that “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been 
discovered by lawful means,” then the evidence should not be excluded.  The Court in 
Williams II rejected a rule that would have required the prosecution to prove the absence of 
bad faith by the police.  Id. at 445. 
379 Id. at 444.  The reason this did not work to save the evidence in Gant itself is because, 
in Gant, the officers “had no intention of impounding Gant’s car until after they searched the 
passenger compartment and found the contraband.”  State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 646 (Ariz. 
2007).  
380 See infra notes 384–389 and accompanying text.  
381 329 F. App’x 794 (10th Cir. 2009). 
382 Id. at 798 n.1. 
383 Id. at 798. 
384 Id.; see also United States v. Allen, No. 4:08-cr-40, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95383, at 
*4–6 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 13, 2009) (upholding search of vehicle as lawful inventory search 
unaffected by Gant); United States v. McCullum, No. 3:07-cr-128, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
93377, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 5, 2009) (same); United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:08-cr-0094, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56826, at *23 n.6 (W.D. Pa. July 2, 2009) (same); United States v. 
Elliot, No. 09cr0082, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40222, at *5–6 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2009) 
(declining to reach the Gant issue because search was lawful inventory search). 
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was utilized by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Ruckes.385  The court in 
Ruckes found that the search at issue did not meet the requirements of a 
search incident to arrest under Gant.386  However, the court affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction because the evidence seized “would have been 
uncovered during a routine inventory search of the vehicle upon 
impound.”387  Although the court in Ruckes applied the inevitable discovery 
rule to save the evidence seized in that case, it noted that “the inevitable 
discovery doctrine will not always save a search that has been invalidated 
under Gant.  The government is still required to prove, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that there was a lawful alternative justification for 
discovering the evidence.”388  A simple Sherpardizing of Gant reveals that 
there is an abundance of other cases in which courts have reached the same 
result.389
 
385 586 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 
386 Id. at 715. 
387 Id. 
388 Id. at 719.  In a subsequent case, United States v. Avendano, No. 08-50505, 2010 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 6836, at *4–5 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010), the Ninth Circuit cited this language from 
Ruckes and held that, in the case before it, the Government could not rely on the inevitable 
discovery rule to save a search made unlawful by Gant where the Government “failed to 
meet its burden of proving standardized local procedure and compliance with that 
procedure.”  Id. at *4; see also United States v. Chavez, No. 2:09-cr-0033, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 116924, at *19-21 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009) (same). 
389 United States v. Stotler, 591 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that, even if 
search was unlawful under Gant, evidence was admissible because it would have inevitably 
been discovered during later inventory search); Davis v. Smith, No. 3:09CV274, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 5163, at *13–14 (E.D. Va. Jan. 22, 2010) (applying same reasoning in civil case 
for unlawful arrest and false imprisonment); United States v. Bradford, No. 09-CR-71, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110385, at *11 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 5, 2009) (“[E]ven if the search of the car 
exceeded the bounds set by Gant, the government demonstrated that the gun would 
inevitably have been discovered pursuant to the inventory search.”); United States v. 
Morillo, No. 08 CR 676, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94396, at *6–7, 23 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2009) 
(despite violation of Gant, evidence was admissible because it would have inevitably been 
discovered during inventory search); United States v. Maxwell, No. 4:09CR299, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 77454, at *7–8 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 2009) (holding that search was permissible 
under Gant and, alternatively, that evidence would have inevitably been discovered during 
inventory search); United States v. Owen, No. 1:09cr38HSO, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85929, 
at *11–12 (S.D. Miss. August 28, 2009) (same); Humphreys v. State, No. S09P1428, 2010 
Ga. LEXIS 227, at *32–33 (Ga. Mar. 15, 2010) (“We need not determine whether the search 
of the [vehicle] after [the defendant]’s arrest was valid under Gant, however, because it is 
apparent that the evidence seized from the vehicle would have been discovered during the 
subsequent inventory of the vehicle and that it was therefore admissible under the inevitable 
discovery rule.”); People v. Reyes, No. B214107, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9935, at 
*15 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2009) (Mosk, J., concurring) (discussing possible application of 
inevitable discovery rule in Gant context). 
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The Court’s holding in Gant, while a good first step towards ensuring 
Fourth Amendment protection in the automobile search context, does not go 
far enough to protect a motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle, an interest 
that the Court in Gant specifically recognized as important.390  In order to 
give its holding in Gant some teeth, the Court will need to follow up with 
decisions limiting either the inventory search exception to the warrant 
requirement, or the inevitable discovery rule.  The former option—that of 
limiting the inventory search exception—seems highly unlikely given the 
Court’s prior decisions regarding that exception to the warrant requirement 
and the legitimate interests served by allowing inventory searches.391
There are several ways in which the Court reasonably could limit the 
inevitable discovery rule, each finding support under the laws of various 
states.  The first option would be to make a distinction between “primary” 
and “secondary” evidence and to hold that the inevitable discovery rule 
applies to save the latter from exclusion, but not the former.
  The 
latter option then—limiting the inevitable discovery rule—appears to be the 
only realistic way in which the loophole around the holding in Gant 
eventually might be closed. 
392  This would 
limit the rule by only allowing evidence completely untainted by the illegal 
search while recognizing the deterrence rationale behind the exclusionary 
rule.  One of the leading jurisdictions to follow this approach is New York.  
In People v. Stith,393 officers initiated a stop of the defendants’ truck tractor 
for speeding.394  When the defendants could not locate the truck’s 
registration, one of the officers ordered them out of the truck and climbed 
into the driver’s side of the truck to conduct his own search.395  After 
removing a portfolio sticking out of a bag, the officer noticed the butt of a 
revolver inside the bag’s side pocket.396  The defendants were arrested for 
criminal possession of a weapon and transported to the local jail.397
 
390 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009) (“Although we have recognized that a 
motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his home . . . the former 
interest is nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional protections.”). 
  On the 
391 See supra notes 365–377 and accompanying text. 
392 For a detailed argument of why the inevitable discovery rule should be applied only to 
secondary, and not primary, evidence, see Jessica Forbes, The Inevitable Discovery 
Exception, Primary Evidence, and the Emasculation of the Fourth Amendment, 55 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1221 (1987). 
393 506 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y. 1987). 
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way to the jail, the officers learned that the defendant’s license had expired 
and that the truck was stolen.398  The defendants were then charged with 
criminal possession of stolen property.399
Prior to trial, the defendants moved to suppress the gun found during 
the search, but the trial court denied the motion.
 
400  On appeal, the appellate 
division affirmed this denial.401  Both of those courts held that, even though 
the search and seizure were in violation of the defendants’ constitutional 
rights, the evidence should not be excluded pursuant to the inevitable 
discovery rule because the gun inevitably would have been discovered 
during an inventory search following the defendants’ arrest when the police 
learned that the truck was stolen.402
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of New York reversed, concluding 
that application of the inevitable discovery rule was not proper in that 
case.
 
403  The court held that, while New York courts had recognized the 
inevitable discovery rule for several years, the courts had “never applied the 
rule where, as here, the evidence sought to be suppressed is the very 
evidence obtained in the illegal search.”404  The court noted that in all of the 
cases in which the inevitable discovery rule had been applied, “the evidence 
saved from suppression by the inevitable discovery rule was not evidence 
illegally obtained during or as the immediate consequence of the challenged 
police conduct,”405 but instead was “evidence obtained indirectly as a result 
of leads or information gained from that primary evidence.”406  
Interestingly, not only did the court in Stith cite other New York court 
decisions to support this proposition, but it also cited the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Williams II, noting that the evidence saved 
from suppression in that case was secondary, rather than primary, 
evidence.407
In support of its holding that the inevitable discovery rule should apply 
only to secondary evidence, the court in Stith noted that: 
 
 
398 Id. at 912–13. 
399 Id. at 913. 




404 Id. at 913–14. 
405 Id. at 914. 
406 Id. 
407 Id. 
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When the inevitable discovery rule is applied to secondary evidence . . . the effect is 
not to excuse the unlawful police actions by admitting what was obtained as a direct 
result of the initial misconduct.  It is not the tainted evidence that is admitted, but only 
what comes from it as a result of further police investigation.  The rationale is that 
when the secondary evidence would have been found independently in any event, “the 
prosecution [should not be] put in a worse position simply because of some earlier 
police error or misconduct.408
The court went on to hold that the same reasoning did not apply when 
it came to the admission of primary evidence: 
 
In contrast, when the inevitable discovery rule is applied to primary evidence, as was 
done here, the result is quite different.  It is the tainted evidence itself and not the 
product of that evidence which is saved from exclusion.  Permitting its admission in 
evidence effects what amounts to an after-the-fact purging of the initial wrongful 
conduct, and it can never be claimed that a lapse of time or the occurrence of 
intervening events has attenuated the connection between the evidence ultimate 
acquired and the initial misconduct.  The illegal conduct and the seizure of the 
evidence are one and the same.409
The court concluded that application of the inevitable discovery rule to 
save primary evidence from suppression “would be an unacceptable 
dilution of the exclusionary rule,” because it would “defeat a primary 
purpose of that rule, deterrence of police misconduct.”
 
410
The New York approach as established by Stith has been utilized by 
New York courts post-Gant to reject application of the inevitable discovery 
rule where a search incident to arrest violates the holding of Gant.  In 
People v. Derrell,
 
411 for instance, the court found that the search at issue 
was illegal under Gant and then rejected the Government’s argument that 
the inevitable discovery rule should apply.412  Citing Stith, the court in 
Derrell held that the inevitable discovery rule did not apply in the case 
before it because the evidence sought to be suppressed was primary, as 
opposed to secondary, evidence.413  Courts in Oregon and Pennsylvania 
have also applied the primary–secondary evidence distinction applied by 
the New York courts.414  The distinction has been rejected by the courts of 
several other states.415
 




411 889 N.Y.S.2d 905 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
412 Id. at 920. 
413 Id. at 920–21. 
414 State v. Crossen, 536 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (“The inevitable discovery 
rule has been applied only to purge the taint from derivative, not primary, evidence and we 
see no reason in this case to extend it to the latter.”); Commonwealth v. Guillespie, 745 A.2d 
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Although the United States Supreme Court has never recognized this 
primary–secondary evidence distinction, the Court’s prior decisions dealing 
with the inevitable discovery rule in no way foreclose the option of it doing 
so in a future case.  As the New York Court of Appeals in Stith correctly 
noted, Williams II, the very case in which the Supreme Court adopted the 
inevitable discovery rule, dealt with secondary, and not primary, 
evidence.416  Importantly, the Court in Williams II cited the deterrence 
rationale of the exclusionary rule,417 but went on to find that, in the case 
before it, admission of the derivative evidence would not further this 
rationale.418
 
654, 662 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding that for inevitable discovery rule to be 
applicable, prosecution must “prove that the secondary evidence . . . was gathered by means 
sufficiently distinguishable from any illegality so as to be ‘purged of its primary taint’ rather 
than deriving from exploitation of the illegality”). 
  This makes sense in the context of secondary or derivative 
evidence—admission of such evidence would in no way work against 
deterring a police officer from conducting an illegal search because such 
secondary evidence is too attenuated from the illegal search to be properly 
 In addition, there is some support for recognition of the primary–secondary evidence 
distinction in at least two federal district court decisions.  In United States v. Massey, for 
example, the district court noted that the inevitable discovery rule—which at that time had 
not yet been recognized by the Supreme Court—“would allow indirect evidence to be 
introduced, notwithstanding its derivative connection to the excluded direct evidence 
resulting from unconstitutional conduct by law enforcement officers, if it were inevitable 
that such indirect evidence would have been discovered and acquired from an independent 
source in any event.”  437 F. Supp. 843, 855 n.3 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (emphasis added).  
Although the Massey decision’s refusal to apply the inevitable discovery rule would 
eventually be overturned by the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams II, this does not mean 
that the Massey decision’s characterization of that rule is no longer applicable.  Similarly, in 
United States v. Guarino—a case decided after Williams II—the district court stated in dicta 
that “[a]nalysis of the application of the inevitable discovery exception depends upon a 
weighing of the facts and a determination of whether the secondary evidence was obtained 
by an independent source or by official exploitation of the primary illegality.”  610 F. Supp. 
371, 379 (D.R.I. 1984) (emphasis added). 
415 See, e.g., People v. Burola, 848 P.2d 958, 962 (Colo. 1993) (“[T]he inevitable 
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies to both primary and secondary 
evidence”); Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 546 N.E.2d 336, 339 (Mass. 1989) (same); State 
v. Sincell, No. 19073, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1656, at *7–8 (2002) (same); State v. Flippo, 
575 S.E.2d 170, 188 n.22 (W. Va. 2002) (same). 
416 In Williams II, the defendant argued that because his confession to murder violated 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and was therefore inadmissible, the derivative 
evidence obtained as a result of the information learned during that confession—the location 
and condition of the victim’s body—should also be excluded from evidence.  467 U.S. 431, 
437 (1984).  The Court in Williams II rejected this, and held that the derivative evidence—
i.e., the body—was admissible under the inevitable discovery rule.  Id. at 447–50. 
417 Id. at 444. 
418 Id. at 446. 
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referred to as a direct consequence of that search.  With primary evidence, 
on the other hand—i.e., “the very evidence obtained in the illegal 
search”419—admission of such evidence works directly against the 
exclusionary rule’s deterrence rationale by allowing police to conduct an 
illegal search knowing that, if they find contraband, the evidence will be 
admitted despite the initial illegality of the search.  As the Oregon Court of 
Appeals noted in State v. Crossen, failing to exclude wrongfully obtained 
primary evidence “would encourage unlawful searches in the hope that 
probable cause would be developed after the fact.”420  Further, prior to the 
Court adopting the inevitable discovery rule in Williams II, the majority of 
lower federal courts and state courts that had applied the rule did so with 
respect to secondary evidence only.421
Adopting New York’s primary–secondary evidence distinction would 
allow the Court to balance the competing interests at play: on the one hand 
acknowledging and respecting the deterrence rationale behind the 
exclusionary rule while, on the other hand, recognizing the prosecution’s 
interest in admitting evidence that is removed from, and untainted by, an 
illegal search.  Or, as Professor Llewellyn would put it, this approach would 
apply the exclusionary rule where the reasons for it—deterrence of illegal 
activity on the part of police—are present, while refusing to apply the 
exclusionary rule where the reasons for it are no longer applicable—where 
the admitted evidence is attenuated from and untainted by the illegal search.  
Adopting this primary–secondary evidence distinction would also decrease, 
if not completely eliminate, the possibility of police and prosecution 
making an end-run around the Court’s holding in Gant by arguing for 
application of the inevitable discovery rule to save the very evidence found 
during the illegal search.  And it would do all of this without having to 
overrule any of the Court’s prior inevitable discovery decisions. 
  This may suggest that, when 
deciding Williams II, the Court intended for the inevitable discovery rule to 
continue to apply only to secondary evidence as it had before. 
There are at least two other ways in which the Court could conceivably 
limit the inevitable discovery rule.  Although these options are less likely to 
be applied by the Court—because the Court would have to overrule its prior 
precedent in order to do so—these options have been utilized in several 
states and are therefore worth discussing briefly.  The first of these 
 
419 People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911, 914 (N.Y. 1987). 
420 536 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Or. Ct. App. 1975). 
421 See Stephen H. LaCount & Anthony J. Girese, The “Inevitable Discovery” Rule, an 
Evolving Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40 ALB. L. REV. 483, 508 
(1975). 
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alternative approaches is to raise the burden of proof that the prosecution 
must meet in order to benefit from the inevitable discovery rule.422  In 
Williams II, the Court set that burden as a preponderance of the evidence.423  
The Court did so based on prior precedent in which it held that “the 
controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no 
greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”424  The 
Court in Williams II stated that it was “unwilling to impose added burdens 
on the already difficult task of proving guilt in criminal cases by enlarging 
the barrier to placing evidence of unquestioned truth before juries.”425  The 
defendant in Williams II argued that the preponderance standard, which was 
used by Iowa state courts, was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Wade, where the Court required clear and 
convincing evidence of an independent source for an in-court 
identification.426  The Court in Williams II rejected this argument, holding 
that, unlike the problems that come with in-court identifications, “inevitable 
discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated 
historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment and does not 
require a departure from the usual burden of proof at suppression 
hearings.”427
When the Court imposes a relatively low burden of proof upon the prosecution 
regarding the likelihood of discovery, it comes closer to requiring a showing that the 
evidence could have been discovered as opposed to requiring that the evidence would 
have been discovered.  A showing of the former does not break the casual chain 
between the initial illegality and the ultimate discovery of the evidence, and use of the 
inevitable discovery exception in such a situation makes the Court’s analogy to the 
independent source doctrine particularly suspect.
  This aspect of the Court’s holding in Williams II has received 
substantial criticism.  For instance, former prosecutor Professor Steven 
Grossman has stated: 
428
The dissent in Williams II, authored by Justice Brennan and joined by 
Justice Marshall, also disagreed with the majority’s holding that inevitable 
discovery need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, and 
 
 
422 For a more detailed discussion on the burden of proof required for inevitable 
discovery, and an argument in support of raising that burden, see Steven P. Grossman, The 
Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery: A Plea for Reasonable Limitations, 92 DICK. L. REV. 313, 
351–52 (1987). 
423 Williams II, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). 
424 Id. at 444 n.5 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n.14 (1974)). 
425 Id. 
426 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967). 
427 Williams II, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. 
428 Grossman, supra note 422, at 353. 
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held that an increased burden of “clear and convincing evidence” should 
instead be applied.429  Further, several states have rejected the 
preponderance standard applied by the majority in Williams II and applied 
the more exacting clear and convincing standard advocated by Justice 
Brennan in his dissent.430
Another less-likely path the Supreme Court could follow to limit the 
applicability of the inevitable discovery rule would be to require the 
prosecution to prove that the police did not act in bad faith to hasten 
discovery of the challenged evidence.  This, however, would require the 
Court to overrule its holding in Williams II expressly rejecting imposition of 
this additional burden.
  Although abandoning the preponderance 
standard in favor of the clear and convincing evidence requirement would 
certainly narrow the pool of cases in which evidence that was otherwise 
illegally seized would nevertheless be deemed admissible, it is unlikely that 
the Court will overrule its holding in Williams II in favor of a more 
stringent quantum of proof. 
431  The Court in Williams II warned that imposition 
of such a requirement “would place courts in the position of withholding 
from juries relevant and undoubted truth that would have been available to 
police absent any unlawful police activity.”432  The Court went on to hold 
that imposing upon the prosecution the burden of proving the absence of 
bad faith would “wholly fail[] to take into account the enormous societal 
cost of excluding truth in the search for truth in the administration of 
justice.”433
 
429 Williams II, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
  Despite the Court’s rejection of this burden in Williams II, 
however, the courts of several states require the prosecution to prove the 
absence of bad faith in order to take advantage of the inevitable discovery 
430 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473, 479–80 (Alaska 1997) (following Justice 
Brennan’s view in Williams II dissent and holding that prosecution must prove inevitable 
discovery by clear and convincing evidence); State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889, 907 (Haw. 1995) 
(same); State v. Sugar, 495 A.2d 90, 103-04 (N.J. 1985) (applying clear and convincing 
evidence standard); see also Proferes v. State, 13 P.3d 955, 958 (Nev. 2000) (seemingly 
applying clear and convincing evidence standard, although also discussing preponderance 
standard); State v. Garner, 417 S.E.2d 502, 512 (N.C. 1992) (Frye, J., concurring) 
(criticizing majority’s rule that inevitable discovery must be proved by preponderance of 
evidence, and advocating for clear and convincing standard). 
431 467 U.S. at 445.  For a detailed argument of why the Court should reconsider its 
holding in Williams II and impose a good faith requirement, see Hon. John E. Fennelly, 
Refinement of the Inevitable Discovery Exception: The Need For a Good Faith Requirement, 
17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1085 (1991). 
432 Williams II, 467 U.S. at 445. 
433 Id. 
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rule.434  Further, several legal scholars, including Professor LaFave, have 
suggested that this additional burden be imposed.435
V. CONCLUSION 
  Again, however, in 
light of Williams II and the reasons set forth in that decision, it is unlikely 
that the Court will impose such a burden on the prosecution. 
After expanding police authority in the context of automobile searches 
incident to arrest for nearly thirty years, the Court finally placed a 
significant limitation on this type of search in Arizona v. Gant.  While the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gant represents a major paradigm shift as to 
what is permissible when it comes to searches incident to arrest, the 
decision’s effect is more theoretical and scholarly than practical.  Despite 
the fact that the Court in Gant dramatically limited the authority of police 
officers to conduct these searches, evidence discovered as a result of 
searches made illegal by Gant is often admitted notwithstanding that 
decision.  This is because prosecutors are often able to get around the Gant 
holding by proving that the evidence at issue inevitably would have been 
discovered had the illegal search not been conducted.  Further, prosecutors 
need only make this showing by a preponderance of the evidence, and the 
rule applies regardless of whether the police were acting in bad faith. 
If the Court wants to give its holding in Gant more practical effect, it 
should adopt the approach taken by the courts of several states under which 
the inevitable discovery rule cannot be applied when the evidence sought to 
be saved from suppression is “primary evidence”—the very evidence 
illegally obtained during or as the immediate consequence of the challenged 
police conduct.  Under this approach, the inevitable discovery rule applies 
only when the evidence in question is “secondary evidence”—evidence 
obtained indirectly as a result of leads or information gained from the 
primary evidence.  Although the Supreme Court has never expressly 
recognized this primary–secondary evidence distinction, none of the 
Court’s prior inevitable discovery decisions foreclose the possibility that it 
could in a future case.  Adopting this approach would undoubtedly make it 
harder, if not impossible, for the prosecution to admit evidence obtained as 
a direct result of a search made illegal by Gant.  This, in turn, would further 
the privacy interest that a motorist has in his vehicle—an interest that the 
Court expressly referred to as important in Gant.  Other options would be to 
raise the burden of proof placed on the prosecution to prove inevitable 
 
434 See, e.g., Smith, 948 P.2d at 481; Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184, 
1190 (Mass. 1997). 
435 See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 11.4(a), at 244 (3d ed. 1996). 
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discovery from a preponderance standard to a clear and convincing 
evidence standard, or to require the prosecution to prove the absence of bad 
faith before the inevitable discovery rule is applied.  However, both of these 
latter approaches would require reversal of prior inevitable discovery 
precedent and are therefore unlikely to be followed.  One thing is for 
certain: until the Court does something to limit the applicability of the 
inevitable discovery rule, police will have little incentive to comply with its 
holding in Gant. 
